Sharing Economy Services: Business Model Generation by Apte, Uday & Davis, Mark M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2019
Sharing Economy Services: Business Model Generation
Apte, Uday; Davis, Mark M.
SAGE
Apte, Uday M., and Mark M. Davis. "Sharing economy services: Business model
generation." California Management Review 61.2 (2019): 104-131.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63915
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.




2019, Vol. 61(2) 104 –131
© The Regents of the 






Sharing Economy  
Services:
Business Model Generation
Uday M. Apte1 and Mark M. Davis2
SUMMARY
The emerging growth of the sharing economy demonstrates the need to understand 
the factors driving this growth and the business models and practices of sharing 
economy service (SES) companies. Using case vignettes as the research method, this 
article analyzes the operations of a large number of these companies and presents 
a set of building blocks that are useful for generating the business models of SES 
companies. An examination of the successes and failures in the practices of SES 
companies provides a number of managerial recommendations.
KEYwoRdS: services, business models, technological innovation, information 
economy, innovation
S haring economy services (SESs) represent a new wave of businesses that use cloud-based technology to match customers with provid-ers of services such as short-term apartment rentals, car rides, and household tasks.1 These SESs are one of the fastest growing segments 
of the economy and are part of the larger information-intensive services sector, 
which is also growing rapidly. The information economy as a percentage of the 
total GDP in the United States has grown from 46.3% in 1967 to 60.2% in 2007, 
and information-intensive services such as those in finance, business, educa-
tion, and health care have grown at even faster rates.2 Although the growth in 
the information economy in the previous century was primarily driven by the 
increasing use of information technology in the operations of traditional busi-
nesses, the growth in the current century has come about mainly as the result of 
more customer-facing transactions in innovative, new industries.
Being a part of this broader trend, the sharing economy traces its origins to 
the beginning of this century as advances in technology have continued to facili-
tate communication between individuals and as the individual customers have 
1Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
2Bentley University, Waltham, MA, USA
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become more comfortable with the use of technology in day-to-day transactions. 
Botsman and Rogers were among the first to recognize the growing importance of 
the sharing economy and its growing impact on business as SESs like Uber and 
Airbnb started to have an impact on traditional businesses in their respective 
industries.3
Airbnb, HomeAway, Uber, and Lyft are some of the best known and most 
successful SES companies. A study concluded that a majority of people in the 
United States own far more assets than they actually need or use; as a result, the 
average cost of owning those assets is unnecessarily high.4 However, if individuals 
could, at their own discretion, share their underutilized assets with others, they 
would recover at least the marginal cost of using those assets, resulting in lower 
average costs. This notion of sharing underutilized assets and recovering the mar-
ginal cost of using them, plus a portion of the fixed cost of owning these assets, is 
one of the main drivers of today’s sharing economy.
The reason that we did not observe more SES companies in the past can be 
attributed to “transaction costs,”5 which are the transaction-related costs that the 
buyer and seller of a service incur in finding/locating each other, establishing trust, 
entering into a contract, delivering the service, and making payments. The signifi-
cant reduction in these transaction costs due to the advances in information tech-
nology has served as a catalyst for the rapid growth of today’s sharing economy.
The sharing economy has grown significantly in the past decade and is 
expected to continue growing rapidly for the foreseeable future. Foye estimates that 
the sharing economy will grow from $18.6 billion in 2017 to $40.2 billion in 2022.6 
Williams believes that this rapid growth in the sharing economy is being fueled by 
millennials, who in 2015 represented the biggest population group in the United 
States with 75.4 million. The combination of their familiarity with state-of-the-art 
technology (specifically mobile technology), the larger value they place on having 
experiences as compared with owning goods, and a willingness to share their 
belongings with others all relate directly to the growth in the sharing economy.7
Another driver of that growth has been the large amount of venture capital 
funding that the industry has received in the last decade. As estimated in 2017 by 
Boston Consulting Group, a total of about $23 billion in venture capital funding 
had been invested in sharing economy companies since 2010.8 Travel-related SES 
companies such as Airbnb, Uber, and Lyft have experienced particularly explosive 
growth in both their market valuations and the size of their operations. For exam-
ple, in 2017, the market valuation of Airbnb was about $31 billion, which was 
comparable to the valuation of about $38 billion for Marriott/Starwood, the 
world’s largest hotel chain. In the same year, Uber had about 600,000 drivers in 
the United States while the taxicab industry employed only about 232,000 taxi 
drivers around the country.9
A Time magazine poll published in January 2016 estimated that 44% of 
Americans had used a SES.10 PricewaterhouseCoopers also reported similar results 
in its survey. That survey also found that among adults familiar with the sharing 
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economy, more than 80% agreed that sharing services made life more affordable, 
convenient, and efficient, and that trust between customers and providers is very 
important for the sharing economy.11
Cooperstein suggests that we are now in the “Age of the Customer,” with 
the power in the marketplace shifting from the producer to the customer.12 A 
major cause for this shift is the emergence of information-intensive services 
(including SES companies) and the ease of access to the information they provide 
through their digital platforms to both the providers and the customers of the 
service. Because of this shift, an increasing number of companies are now focus-
ing more on how they interface with their customers and how they restructure 
their supply chains. There appear to be two major approaches to accomplishing 
this. Companies such as Tesla, Apple, and Dell, which are often referred to as full 
stack companies, tend to be vertically integrated; that is, they design, produce, and 
deliver complete products and services while simultaneously managing their cus-
tomer interactions in a more direct manner.13 In contrast, a much faster growing 
trend that is being adopted by companies is what we call thin stack companies. 
These thin stack firms typically control only a small portion of their respective 
supply chains, focusing primarily on the interface with both their suppliers and 
customers through digital platforms. The reason for their significant growth is the 
relatively low entry barriers to designing a digital platform and subsequently col-
lecting, managing, and disseminating information. SES companies are prime 
examples of thin stack companies that link customers in need of a service with the 
suppliers of that service.
Although the sharing economy has evolved over time and has many defi-
nitions, in our view, SES companies have three main characteristics: they link 
customers in need of a service with the suppliers of that service, they operate 
through digital platforms such as a website or a mobile app, and they offer services 
based on underutilized physical assets and/or labor.
In essence, SES companies provide a matchmaking service where individual 
customers or businesses can take part on either or both sides of a service transaction. 
Today, examples of SES companies are found in all types of service settings, including 
peer-to-peer (P2P), business-to-consumer (B2C), and business-to-business (B2B) 
services. However, this article primarily focuses on P2P services, which were the 
genesis of the sharing economy and still exist in large part today.
The sharing economy clearly serves as a good example of the democratiza-
tion of business, which allows individuals to enter markets for the first time and 
compete almost immediately as equals with larger, well-established companies. 
SESs have facilitated this democratization through their digital platforms, which 
have significantly reduced transaction costs to both the individual providers and 
customers while simultaneously opening up new, previously untapped markets 
for both.
The P2P services in the sharing economy are not only about using under-
utilized resources; they can also provide an attractive and more profitable option 
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for households and private individuals. For example, in an Airbnb investment 
property the landlord can collect higher rents in total as compared with traditional 
long-term tenancy. Interestingly, this can also lead to a lower occupancy rate. 
Thus, in the sharing economy, in some instances, the resource may actually 
become less utilized as compared with traditional approaches.
There are a number of reasons why it is interesting and important to study 
SES companies: they are innovative businesses that represent a fast-growing part 
of the economy with a relatively low cost of entry14; they have generated a tre-
mendous amount of interest as well as controversy in recent years15; they typi-
cally have a major impact on the traditional businesses with which they compete16; 
and they tend to have a positive impact on sustainability and the environment 
since they utilize existing underutilized resources.17
The objectives of this article are to study a range of SES companies in 
selected service industries to better understand the innovative approaches they 
use and the plausible reasons behind their successes and failures, develop a set of 
proposed business model building blocks that can be used to generate, describe, 
and analyze the business models of SES companies, and offer managerial recom-
mendations for SES companies as well as for the traditional businesses they com-
pete with.
Survey of Literature Related to Sharing Economy
The Evolving Sharing Economy
A 2010 book by Botsman and Rogers18 described the vision of “sharing,” 
which was the main attraction behind the rise of the sharing economy move-
ment. Since then, innumerable articles about the sharing economy have been 
published in the popular press and consulting company reports,19 essentially 
painting a rosy picture of the movement. Most of those articles do not contain 
any hard-nosed analysis and often just reiterate the original vision about the 
benefits of sharing and the claims made by websites and promoters of SES com-
panies. A report by Brookings India,20 however, provides an interesting insight 
into the emergence of the sharing economy in the other parts of the world. Since 
most customers in underdeveloped economies, such as India, cannot afford to 
acquire even moderately expensive assets, the opportunity to use those assets 
through the sharing economy concept is highly appealing. Thus, sharing econ-
omy companies are likely to have a very bright future in the underdeveloped 
economies of the world. A recent book by Sundararajan provides a thoughtful 
survey of the developments in the sharing economy in the United States and in 
Europe.21
In the past few years, however, articles and blogs have started to raise 
red flags about the disconnect between the current reality and the original 
vision in the sharing economy.22 Two recent books on the sharing economy, 
one by Hill23 and the other by Slee,24 argue that the business practices of some 
of the largest and most successful SES companies, such as Airbnb and Uber, 
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have evolved into something different than that envisioned by the early SES 
firms. The leading companies have become large corporations themselves, and 
the profit-making motive now seems to be the only driver in carrying out trans-
actions in an unregulated, free market sense. The researchers argue, with con-
vincing evidence, that the success of SES companies stems primarily from their 
objectionable business practices, such as not following, to the extent possible, 
the rules and regulations under which their traditional competitors operate—
thereby avoiding the associated expenses—and keeping the suppliers of the 
service (such as drivers of a ride-sharing service) off the payroll, treating them 
instead as independent contractors—thereby minimizing costs by not paying 
benefits such as pension obligations, vacation time, or worker insurance against 
injury.
Transaction Cost Economics
A basic assumption in neo-classical economics is that all economic agents 
have access to full information about the quantities and prices of all products and 
services, as well as about all production and consumption possibilities, and that 
the only costs to be considered are the costs associated with production and con-
sumption.25 Coase changed this basic assumption by introducing the real-world 
view that economic agents only have access to limited information and that they 
incur many costs in transacting in markets.26 He argued that due to the existence 
of “transaction costs,” which can be quite large at times, economic agents find 
it beneficial to organize large economic entities (such as corporations) to pro-
duce goods and services and thereby lower transaction costs. Thus, Coase offered 
transaction costs as the primary explanation for the existence of large-scale 
enterprises. Were there no costs of transacting between the agents in markets, 
the structure of industries would be composed of individual buyers and sellers of 
goods and services.
Williamson further developed the concept of transaction cost economics by 
building on Simon’s bounded rationality hypothesis.27 Williamson argued that 
transaction costs are created due to the fact that all economic agents exhibit 
bounded rationality and act opportunistically, that assets have specificity in their 
use, that transactions are carried out with smaller or larger frequencies, and that 
uncertainties cannot be avoided.
Applying transaction cost economics to the sharing economy, Henten and 
Windekilde28 explain that the main innovations offered by SESs are the multi-
sided platforms29 they provide that easily link buyers and sellers of services to 
significantly reduce transaction costs. This reduction in transaction costs is the 
main reason why there has been an explosion of innovative service economy 
enterprises in the United States.
The transaction costs have also been significantly reduced by SES compa-
nies that are taking advantage of a concept known as “service inventories.” This 
concept was first introduced by Chopra and Lariviere30 and subsequently expanded 
upon by Davis, Field, and Stavrulaki.31 The goal in creating service inventories is to 
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facilitate and/or reduce the steps (and time) in the service delivery process, which 
lowers transaction costs and creates customer value during a service encounter.
Another factor that has been facilitated by technology, especially cloud 
technology, is the ease of access to these SESs. Berry et al.32 identified service 
innovations—in terms of how firms provide access to their core services—as 
opportunities for companies to either develop previously untapped markets, as 
with SESs, or gain a competitive advantage, exemplified by Amazon’s online book 
sales in contrast to Borders’ (which is now defunct) store-based retail sales.
The ease with which SES companies can collect payments from their cus-
tomers and pay their service providers has had a significant positive impact on 
their growth and this can also be attributed to advances in technology. It is not a 
coincidence that online payment system companies such as Stripe (used by Lyft 
and TaskRabbit) and Braintree (used by Uber), among many others, emerged 
around the same time as the SES companies. The payment processing APIs 
(Application Programming Interfaces) of the payment system companies are easy 
to embed within the digital platforms of SES companies, and that has made it 
easier for the SES companies to receive payment from its customers and to pay 
their service providers, such as Uber drivers and Airbnb homeowners. Moreover, 
some of these online payment system companies are also able to split payments 
from customers. This ability enables services where a group of customers sharing 
a service (such as an Uber ride or an Airbnb home) can each pay for his or her use 
separately using their individual apps.
The Service Triads
Although a dyad consisting of a buyer and a seller of goods or services 
has been the focus of research in business and economics for a long time, the 
study of triads has gained considerable importance and momentum in the last 
two decades. Earlier work by Smith and Laage-Hellman described the impor-
tance of small networks as a basis for understanding particular aspects of net-
work structure and processes.33 Subsequently, studies in manufacturing by Choi 
and Wu,34 informed by social network theory, brought the triad to the forefront 
as an object of investigation, while Li and Choi extended the study of triads to 
service settings.35 In their lead article in a special issue on service triads, Wynstra 
et al. provide a review of different strands of research and various theoretical 
frameworks that are useful for studying service triads.36 They find that service 
triads are currently studied in several fields including operations management, 
supply chain management, management and organization studies, and the social 
sciences. Another useful survey article by Sengupta et al. identifies ten themes of 
research in service triads.37
In service triads, the end customer contracts with an intermediary firm 
(exemplified by an SES company such as Airbnb), but the service is provided to 
the end customer by a subcontractor of the intermediary firm (such as a home-
owner willing to rent a room in the case of Airbnb). Here, the service interaction 
takes place essentially between the service provider and the end customer. 
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Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the service triad in the sharing economy. 
Since the intermediary firm does not provide the service, it needs to establish 
and nurture its relationship not only with the customer but also with the service 
provider. Thus, in a service triad, the intermediary firm faces what Eisenmann 
et al. call a two-sided market.38
Li and Choi have examined the dynamics of service triads.39 Among a 
number of findings, they argued that the role of the service provider is potentially 
critical and that the ongoing interactions between the service provider and the 
customer, after service delivery begins, can undermine the relationship between 
the intermediary and the customer in the long run. Hence, unless the intermedi-
ary firm, that is, the SES company, offers a unique value, it can face a risk of dis-
intermediation, whereby the customer establishes a direct relationship with the 
service provider in accessing the service in the future.
The service triad is a unique form of the service constellation concept that 
was introduced by Normann and Ramirez,40 who suggested that value creation in 
services is not linear as defined by Porter’s value chain,41 but rather requires 
cocreation with several entities (including customers), which often occurs simul-
taneously. (The concept of value cocreation involving both producers and cus-
tomers is one of the major components in the seminal work on Service Dominant 
Logic [SDL] that was introduced by Vargo and Lusch.42) The recognition that the 
cocreation of value by both suppliers and customers is especially important for 
SES companies is demonstrated by the fact that both suppliers and customers 
often have the opportunity to evaluate each other through surveys.
As Kwan and Hottum point out,43 these triads are part of a larger service 
system that often involves many players. Thus, the multisided platforms that SES 
companies operate are designed to accommodate additional players. Examples of 
these additional players include credit card companies for payments and social 
media companies such as Facebook and Yelp that provide customers’ evaluations 
of the services. Multisided platforms and two-sided markets are key concepts 
associated with sharing economy companies in that they shape their economics 
of the industry and influence the competitive dynamics. It is important to keep 
Figure 1. Service triad with sharing economy service.
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in mind the relationship and differences between these key concepts. The two-
sided markets represent an economic/actor perspective about actions taken, 
while multisided platforms are the organizations (and their products or services) 
that create value by linking and enabling direct interactions (between two or 
more sides) that improve the ease of conducting business and reduce the transac-
tion costs.
The Sharing Economy: An Empirical Inquiry into the 
Phenomenon
To achieve the goals of our exploratory research, we used the case study 
approach, defined by Yin as a research method involving empirical inquiry 
that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context.44 However, as Yin 
suggests, the evidence from multiple cases is likely to be far more compelling 
and robust. Hence, we adopted the case vignette methodology followed by 
Kleinbaum and Stuart.45 Specifically, we used secondary data to study business 
models and operations of 53 SES companies to understand their innovative 
approaches. Of the 53 SES companies we studied, ten companies had failed and 
the remaining 43 were still in operation at the time of our study. Studying both 
types of companies allowed us to better understand the plausible reasons behind 
the successes and failures of SES companies and provided us with some insights 
in developing managerial recommendations.
In selecting specific companies to study, we started with a classification 
scheme that is based on the resource being shared with customers: physical, labor, 
or a combination of both. Within each class, we chose industries in which SES 
companies have been launched in reasonably large numbers. In compiling the 
case vignettes, we relied on secondary data.
SESs: A Classification
We identify three categories of SES companies based on the resources 
they offer to their customers.
Physical assets. Airbnb and HomeAway are examples of companies that facilitate 
the sharing of underutilized assets. They help homeowners rent out their under-
utilized rooms, apartments, and houses to customers in need of short-term lodg-
ing. Another example is Roost, which makes it feasible for homeowners to rent 
out excess storage capacity available in their homes or apartments.
Physical assets and labor combined. The next category of SES companies involves 
those that allow sharing of physical assets and labor combined. The SES compa-
nies that occupy this space include Uber and Lyft, which provide digital platforms 
linking available drivers with vehicles to the customers seeking transportation.
Labor. We further divide the category of SES firms that enable sharing of labor 
into three subcategories, while acknowledging that there is some overlap among 
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the three. The different types of labor being shared in these subcategories are 
physical labor, SES companies (such as Wag and Taskrabbit) that focus primarily 
on those individuals who are willing to offer their available time in the form of 
physical labor; skilled labor, SES companies (such as Angie’s List and HomeAdvi-
sor) that link individuals/firms with specific skill sets to customers in need of 
these skills; and intellectual/creative labor, SES companies that offer professional 
services (such as health care, legal advice, and tutorial services). Given that the 
focus of this research is on P2P companies, we exclude service providers that are 
businesses.
The Evolution, Business Practices, Industry Economics, and Impact of 
SES Companies
The term sharing economy suggests two things that are somewhat contra-
dictory to each other.46 On one hand, the idea of “sharing” suggests noncom-
mercial, person-to-person or P2P exchanges that involve no money and that are 
driven by the desire to help others by sharing resources. On the other hand, the 
term “economy” suggests market transactions involving an exchange of goods or 
services for money. Interestingly, the contradiction between the first and the sec-
ond words in the term sharing economy also reflects the evolution of the sharing 
economy itself.
Kessler pointed out that while sharing is a much-loved idea, the compa-
nies formed in the earlier years that were based on the idea of sharing in its 
purest form have been mostly unsuccessful.47 Consider, for example, SES com-
panies based on sharing a power drill, which probably is used for only 15 min-
utes total in its entire lifetime. That being the case, why not rent a power drill or 
rent out your own power drill to other people and make a little money? The 
argument makes perfect sense. However, of the eight SES companies that were 
launched based on this idea, only one company, NeighborGoods, survived for a 
few years, and that too eventually folded. The reason behind these failures is the 
relatively high transaction cost. It seems that most customers who need a power 
drill prefer to simply buy it at a cost of, say, $30 and not spend an hour of their 
time to locate, pick up, and return the tool, plus pay a small rental fee. Hence, it 
is essential that even when the idea of sharing is highly attractive, an SES com-
pany must carefully evaluate and minimize the transaction cost involved in 
sharing.
Two companies that have become successful despite their primary focus on 
sharing have appealed to an inherent human tendency, as social creatures, to 
share with others what they have, while explicitly making clear that the compa-
ny’s main aim is to help share and not make money. These companies are 
BlaBlaCar, a French SES company that helps passengers undertake inexpensive, 
long-distance, intercity travel, practically at cost, and CouchSurfing, which allows 
travelers to stay for free as guests with locals. Interestingly, CouchSurfing decided 
to change its status from a nonprofit to a for-profit company, and that move has 
led to serious objections by many members and to a string of ongoing problems 
for the company.
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As is expected in any new industry, SES companies have experienced their 
share of failures. For example, FlightCar, a P2P airport car-rental company, was 
launched in 2013 to connect visitors interested in renting cars at the airport with 
locals looking to park their cars before flying out. The idea was promising, but the 
company was closed in 2016, primarily because it was focusing mainly on growth 
before putting in place a reasonable business process for achieving a good ser-
vice-market fit, and due to its patchy and poor service quality.48 Another exam-
ple is Sidecar, which started as a ride-share company in 2011. Being a late entry 
into this market, it struggled to compete with Uber and Lyft and ultimately closed 
in 2015 after trying to deliver groceries and food before its closure. The main 
reasons behind Sidecar’s failure were legal/regulatory problems, a lack of focus 
and perseverance, and an inability to achieve scale and efficiency in a reasonably 
short time.
Although it is true that the sharing economy is growing fast, and this 
growth is forecasted to continue, the sharing economy faces significant challenges 
going forward, which include the following49:
 • Network effects: In Uber’s case, the more drivers there are, the more conve-
nient Uber’s service becomes to its customers. However, the more customers 
there are, the more likely the drivers are to sign up to drive for Uber. This 
positive feedback loop potentially offers increasing benefits to Uber’s custom-
ers and drivers, as well as to Uber. However, the network effects for Uber are 
somewhat weak since they are local. Having more drivers in New York City 
does benefit customers in that city. However, the benefits to customers living 
elsewhere are rather limited in the sense that they are realized only when 
those customers visit New York City.
 • Economies of scale: It takes a large investment to develop a digital platform, but 
once the platform is ready, it can be made available to additional customers 
without incurring any additional cost. Thus, economies of scale do exist, but 
they are somewhat limited since new ventures also need to spend large sums 
of money on marketing and sales to continue attracting new customers and 
on incentives to attract additional service suppliers.
 • Switching costs: The cost of switching from one SES company to another is 
small for both the customers and the providers. For example, a customer (or 
a driver) can easily switch from Uber to Lyft without incurring any penalty.
Uber, Airbnb, and Taskrabbit are perhaps the best-known companies in the 
three categories of SES companies proposed earlier, and they represent a major 
portion of the total revenue and market valuation of the sharing economy. As 
mentioned earlier, all three companies have come under severe scrutiny concern-
ing their questionable business practices in recent years.50
Uber has been highly successful in terms of its phenomenal growth in both 
market share and revenue, but what is not particularly well-known is that it also 
happens to be one of the largest loss-making private companies in the tech 
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industry. As the Associated Press recently reported, in 2017, the company lost 
$4.5 billion on an annual gross revenue of $37 billion.51 With the need to main-
tain a two-sided marketplace involving passengers and drivers, the company 
offers low fares to attract customers and sign-up bonuses to drivers to maintain a 
large enough pool of drivers. This has significantly hurt its profitability. Uber does 
have economies of scale in its operation, but evidently it has yet to reach a scale 
sufficient to start making a profit, raising the question of whether the company is 
ever going to make a profit.
Uber has also run afoul of livery regulations in almost all the cities in 
which it offers its services. Uber’s history of scandals and disregard for local rules 
finally caught up with it in September 2017 when London’s transportation 
authority ruled that Uber is not a “fit and proper” operator and declined to 
renew the company’s license to operate in the city, Uber’s largest European 
market.52 The reasons cited by the authority when explaining its decision include 
the company’s questionable safety record, its bypassing of regulations that 
licensed taxi services have to follow (screening of drivers, inspection of vehicles, 
and employment laws), and its avoidance of tax payments by registering the 
company in another country. In addition, in December 2017, the European 
Union’s court ruled that Uber should be regulated like a taxi company and not a 
technology service, a decision that is likely to constrain Uber’s activities in 
European countries.53
Roose reported that, at present, most SES companies are small, are losing 
money, and are mainly surviving on venture capital. Dozens of “Uber for X” 
start-ups that raised millions of dollars to launch SES companies in industries 
such as laundry, parking, and grocery delivery have run out of capital before 
reaching the necessary break-even volumes.54 Since many SES companies face 
the same problems that Uber did—spending more than their revenues or subsi-
dies, and marketing and sales to get additional customers and providers—a bumpy 
road is not necessarily out of the picture for the industry.
Although the current size of the sharing economy, relative to the total 
economy, is small, SES companies have had a measurable impact in the service 
sectors where they have established themselves. For example, a study that exam-
ined hotel revenues in Texas showed that in those areas where Airbnb had a 
major market penetration, the revenues of hotels had significantly reduced in 
comparison to no decrease in revenues in similar hotels in areas where Airbnb 
had not established a presence, with economy or budget hotels being the most 
affected.55 Another study in the hotel industry, as reported by Gerdeman,56 con-
firms that in those geographical areas where Airbnb had significant market pen-
etration, hotel room bookings and revenues had decreased. This is attributed to 
the fact that during peak periods, hotels typically charge a premium for rooms, 
but individuals, through Airbnb, seeing the opportunity to make higher than nor-
mal income from renting out their rooms and apartments during these peak peri-
ods, make them available when they otherwise would not. This is one of the 
major advantages that SES firms have over traditional services: the costs that are 
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fixed for traditional services (i.e., for rooms, cars) are variable costs for SES firms. 
An increase in rates, be it for a room or a ride, increases the available capacity for 
SES firms.
As another example, consider the impact of Uber on the taxi industry in 
New York City. There has been a drop in the average price of a taxi medallion in 
New York City from $1.3 million in 2013 to $900,000 in March 2017.57
Common Characteristics of SES Companies
The SES companies we studied had several common characteristics:
 • They are the intermediaries in the traditional service triangle connecting 
customers in need of services with suppliers providing the services. The pri-
mary value added by these firms is their ability to establish networks for 
both suppliers and customers; to collect, aggregate, and disseminate data; 
and to collect payments from customers and pay suppliers for their services. 
All digital platforms created by the SES companies are cloud-based, mak-
ing them readily accessible at any time and from anywhere in the world. In 
effect, these firms are using internet-based mediation to inject themselves 
into the supply chains.
 • The service suppliers are typically amateurs (with no formal experience) in 
the respective industries in which these SES firms operate. SES companies 
are creating new opportunities for the amateur suppliers to earn money.
 • The SES companies tend to carry out transactions on a P2P basis where indi-
vidual service providers offer services to individual customers. Self-employed 
farmers and craftsmen were the norm in the preindustrial era. During the 
industrial revolution, emerging manufacturing automation technologies 
displaced the craftsmen, and modern management practices enabled the 
formation of large corporations that started offering goods and services to 
customers.58 However, the emerging digital platforms of SES companies have 
facilitated direct interaction between the individuals offering services and the 
customers of those services, possibly going back to preindustrial era practices 
in a small way.
 • The services offered by SES companies are typically simple, single-stage ser-
vices rather than complex or multistage services.
 • In many respects, in comparison with traditional service providers, SES com-
panies exhibit large flexibility in managing their capacity. In fact, they do not 
own the service capacity they need to serve their customers; hence, other 
than the extra incentives they offer to attract suppliers in special situations, 
the SES companies incur virtually no incremental cost in adding capacity 
because the burden of providing capacity rests with their suppliers.
 • In many instances, the SES companies that include physical assets in their ser-
vice offerings can be viewed as being environmentally friendly, because they 
require no additional resources for satisfying additional customer demand.
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Business Model for SES Companies
A business model is defined by Teece as “a design or architecture of the 
value creation, delivery and capture mechanism.”59 Over the past two decades, 
business models have received increased attention among practitioners and 
researchers. However, as Foss and Saebi state in their survey article,60 “emerging 
business model innovation literature lacks theoretical underpinning and empiri-
cal inquiry is not cumulative.” Since developing a proposed set of business model 
building blocks for SES companies is a goal of this empirical study, we had an 
opportunity to address these gaps. Accordingly, we selected the business model 
by Osterwalder and Pigneur61 as a starting point in developing the proposed 
business model. The Osterwalder and Pigneur model, well-known in the prac-
titioner world, consists of nine basic building blocks: Customer Segments, Value 
Proposition, Channels, Customer Relationships, Key Resources, Key Activities, 
Partnerships, Revenue Streams, and Cost Structure. In addition, we also referred 
to a survey of business models of e-businesses by Zott et al. to become familiar 
with the building blocks proposed by researchers.62
Proposed business model building blocks. To investigate whether Osterwalder and 
Pigneur’s business model building blocks are suitable for adequately describ-
ing the business models of SES companies, we applied those building blocks to 
several SES companies we had studied. This exercise made it clear to us that to 
properly describe the way SES companies create, deliver, and capture value, the 
best approach would be to add two new building blocks and make slight adjust-
ments to the original set of building blocks in Osterwalder and Pigneur’s model.
The primary business of SES companies is to create a match between cus-
tomers and suppliers of a service. Hence, we suggest using “suppliers” as a new 
building block, which was not explicitly included in the original set. In addition, 
because SES companies typically enter existing markets with entirely new busi-
ness models in terms of how they operate, analyzing traditional competitors and 
defining competitive priorities for these companies become highly important. 
Hence, we introduce “competitive priorities” as the second new building block. 
Furthermore, since we invariably found it easier to think through “customer 
relationships” while defining the “customers” building block, we decided to 
merge these two to create a single modified building block having the same 
name, “customers.” With the same consideration, we also merged “key resources” 
with “key activities” into a single modified building block titled “key resources 
and activities.” Thus, we believe that using all the original building blocks by 
Osterwalder and Pigneur, albeit in terms of seven as opposed to nine blocks, 
along with two new building blocks added to the set, will be suitable for describ-
ing the business models of SES companies. To confirm the validity of this asser-
tion, we used our modified set of nine building blocks to describe the business 
models of all the SES companies in our study. We found that the set was indeed 
sufficient and suitable. We emphasize that this is an empirical finding and to that 
extent, the set of building blocks we propose is perhaps not the only way to 
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describe the business models of SES companies, but what we propose was per-
fectly suitable for describing the SES companies we studied. Figure 2 presents a 
schematic diagram of the proposed business model building blocks, which is then 
followed by their short descriptions:
 • Competitive priorities: There are several well-known frameworks for determining 
an organization’s competitive priorities. Two of the more popular frameworks 
developed by Porter and by Treacy and Wiersema offer a low-cost alternative 
as a specific strategy that firms can adopt.63 Low cost appears to be the strat-
egy, at least initially, that SES firms typically adopt. The low-cost approach is 
also the preferred alternative for new businesses with a novel approach for 
creating customer value in a vast array of industries,64 primarily because the 
technology adopted by SES companies readily supports this strategy.
 • Value propositions (for customers, suppliers, and partners): For the long-term 
success of an SES company, it is important to use its competitive priorities 
as the basis to clearly define its value propositions to customers, service pro-
viders, and partners, and ultimately to deliver them in practice. The primary 
value that SES companies create for their customers is the company’s ability 
to quickly link customers seeking a specific service to a supplier that can pro-
vide the desired service. Value to the customer is therefore measured along 
several dimensions, including convenience in locating a suitable supplier, 
response speed (whether it is to an inquiry for a house rental or a request for 
transportation), and variety of offerings (which, with respect to rental prop-
erties, can be location and types of properties; for labor it can be the different 
skill levels that can be provided).
 • Customers: For SES companies, customer demand is obviously created through 
the cloud. Consequently, one could argue that the customers for SES compa-
nies are segmented by their ability to use technology in one form or another. 
Figure 2. Business model building blocks for SES companies.
Note: SES = sharing economy service.
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The way an SES company manages its relationships with its customers 
through the digital platform to increase trust and loyalty of customers is very 
important for the company’s long-term success.
 • Suppliers: Since the SES companies do not create and deliver the service 
themselves, it is critical that they recruit, monitor, and nurture the best set of 
suppliers who are responsible for the creation and delivery of the service. The 
business development activities toward that end are therefore very impor-
tant. Managing relationships with suppliers is also critically important.
 • Partners: For SES companies, a partner refers to an organization that plays 
a supportive role in the service creation and delivery process. Typical SES 
partner companies are payment systems companies, credit card companies, 
insurance companies, and rating services such as Yelp and Trip Advisor that 
provide feedback on previous customer experiences.
 • Delivery channel: Creating the best possible match between the customer and 
the service provider is the fundamental value-add of SES companies. Accord-
ingly, the use of internet and mobile app software platforms for that purpose 
is the distinguishing characteristic of SES companies. It is therefore critical 
that this software platform be carefully developed and continually improved 
to offer the best service and value to customers and service providers.
 • Key resources and activities: An SES company should acquire all the needed 
resources, such as information technology assets, so that it is able to perform 
the activities required for its business models to work. The key activities in 
the delivery process must be designed to maximize efficiency and minimize 
transaction costs for the customers, deliver on value propositions, and create 
and nurture a network of customers, suppliers, and partners. Key activities 
common to almost all SES companies are the development and maintenance 
of a software platform that can suitably match customers and suppliers in a 
timely manner, the maintenance of a database of customers and suppliers, 
and the establishment of performance monitoring systems by seeking feed-
back from customers and suppliers.
 • Revenue stream: As is true for all companies, generating revenues and profits 
are the primary goals of SES companies. Hence, understanding the revenue 
stream that an SES company can generate—through such means as trans-
action-based commissions, membership fees, rental or advertising fees, and 
profit margins on suppliers used in service creation—is important.
 • Cost structure: SES firms provide the networks that link customers wanting 
specific services to individuals or firms that provide them. Consequently, their 
primary costs are the fixed costs associated with creating the digital platform 
and the variable costs associated with maintaining the platform, increasing 
the number of customers, and enlarging the supplier base. This results in 
economies of scale in operation.
As mentioned earlier, we used the proposed set of building blocks to 
describe the business models of 43 SES companies that were in operation at the 
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time of our study. We found that the business models of SES companies offering 
the same type of service were highly similar. For example, Getaround and Turo 
are both P2P car-rental companies that allow private car owners to rent out their 
vehicles to individual customers via their digital platforms. The business models of 
these two companies are essentially the same. Hence, we felt that illustrating the 
business model of only one of these two companies was sufficient for the purpose 
of this article. Applying the same logic, we present in Table 1 the business models 
of 25 selected SES companies as a sample that represents a large number of com-
panies across all service types included in the study. The remaining 18 SES com-
panies belonged to several service types (the number of companies studied for 
each service type is shown in parenthesis): transportation (3), delivery (1), dog 
walking (1), parking (1), laundry (2), miscellaneous trades (5), and professional 
services (5).
It should be noted that for the sake of brevity, we have not presented infor-
mation about three building blocks in Table 1: competitive priorities (since most 
SES companies seem to use low cost as the main competitive strategy), delivery 
channel (internet and mobile apps were invariably the main delivery channel), 
and key resources and activities (based on our understanding of the industry and 
service operations we did prepare lists of key resources and activities, but those 
lists were rather detailed and long).
SESs: Managerial Challenges and Recommendations
Unlike most traditional businesses, SES companies offer neither prod-
ucts nor services of their own. Rather, the value they generate is the way they 
collect, aggregate, and present information to potential customers and service 
providers in creating a match. To the extent that the operational character-
istics of SES companies are significantly different from those of traditional 
companies, the entrepreneurs and managers of these firms face a unique set 
of challenges.
Managing Growth Is Critical
As an intermediary in the service triad, the SES companies operate in 
a “two-sided marketplace.” Consider, for example, the experience of Uber. As 
mentioned earlier, the more riders there are on Uber’s platform, the better it is 
for drivers because they can earn more money. Conversely, the more available 
drivers there are, the better it is for riders because they can obtain rides in shorter 
times at lower prices. This positive feedback cycle implies not only first mover 
advantages but also the potential for winner-take-all dynamics. Kick-starting this 
positive feedback cycle is a primary challenge for any SES company. Uber seems 
to have met this challenge by raising huge sums of money from venture capital-
ists and using it to nurture its two-sided marketplace and growing rapidly in over 
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In managing growth, an SES company should carefully evaluate whether 
the industry it operates in and the competitive situation it faces are favorable for 
a winner-take-all outcome, in which only one platform survives. In general, a 
networked market will be served by the single platform only when the costs of 
enrolling in multiple platforms are too high for both sides of the market.65 In the 
case of a ride-sharing service, the cost of switching from Uber to, say, Lyft is rather 
low for customers, and it is not particularly high for drivers either. Hence, the 
ride-sharing service is not conducive to a winner-take-all outcome, and it is likely 
that several platforms will survive and thrive in that market. In addition, as dis-
cussed earlier in the ride-sharing service, the network effects are weak. SES com-
panies are well-advised to take calculated, measured steps in growing their 
businesses versus burning large amounts of capital to grow very rapidly in service 
markets where multiple platforms are likely to survive.
The final consideration in managing growth is the need to reach a suffi-
ciently large volume of business in a reasonably short time. Essentially, all start-
ups must reach a financial break-even volume before they burn all their start-up 
capital. Otherwise, their fate will be like that of many start-ups that went bust in 
the dot-com era of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
First Develop a Supplier Base and Then Attract Customers
SES companies focus on connecting customers with service providers, 
but they themselves do not create and deliver these services. Hence, the process 
for selecting and managing the supplier base that provides these services is criti-
cal to ensure a consistently high level of service quality. This is a major factor in 
the long-term success of SES firms (as it is for all firms). As we have found in 
our case studies, and as Andruss66 and Blanding67 argue, the first ideal step is to 
develop a reliable set of suppliers for the service that the SES company plans to 
provide; the next step is to then focus on attracting the right customers for these 
suppliers.
For example, consider Uber, whose process for screening drivers has 
recently come under severe fire in a CNN investigation that reported that a large 
number of Uber drivers have been accused of sexual assault or abuse of female 
passengers.68 At the other end of the spectrum is Rover, a dog boarding and 
walking service that connects dog owners with a network of dog lovers for hire. 
Rover is known for its rigorous screening and training program for its service 
providers.69 Rover uses an extensive review process that involves checking refer-
ences, conducting background checks, and verifying social media accounts. The 
company also conducts online training and a review to ensure that every supplier 
applicant interested in providing the service has the personality, experience, and 
environment suitable for the dog-sitting or walking service. We believe that 
undertaking such a rigorous screening of suppliers to eliminate undesirable ser-
vice providers must be viewed as a critical success factor by an SES company; 
otherwise, the company risks unfavorable press concerning poor service quality 
immediately after the launch of the service.
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Design the Service Delivery Process to Add Value to Customers and 
Reduce Transaction Costs
In our study, the successful SES companies were those that were able to 
make the service delivery process as efficient as possible. The design and devel-
opment of the software is of paramount importance in this regard, but there are 
several other factors to consider in designing the operational processes:
 • Two alternate modes of delivery in fulfilling demand are observed: an imme-
diate, real-time delivery of service (e.g., Uber) or a scheduled delivery of ser-
vice at some time in the future (e.g., Vetpronto). The logistics infrastructure 
needed to offer immediate real-time delivery is usually more demanding and 
more expensive.
 • There appear to be at least two approaches in creating the match: the cus-
tomer chooses among several service providers (e.g., TaskRabbit), or the com-
pany finds the best possible match between the customer and the service 
provider (e.g., Uber).
 • Developing a suitable supplier base is critically important. One option is to 
develop a contractual relationship (exclusive or otherwise) with a set of ser-
vice providers; the other is to have the ability to call upon the suppliers with 
whom there is no exclusive contract. The cost, quality, and reliability trade-
offs should be considered in choosing the option.
 • Another operational design choice is whether the service is to be provided at 
the customer’s site or if a customer is to travel to the service provider’s site to 
access the service.
Ensure Service Quality, Create Good Customer Experience, and Foster 
Trust
Ensuring a high and consistent level of service quality is very challenging 
because it is highly subjective, being primarily dependent on the perceptions of 
the customer. Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, in their seminal research proj-
ect, identified five dimensions of service quality: reliability, tangibles, responsive-
ness, assurance, and empathy.70 They also introduced the Service Quality Gap 
Model, which provides service practitioners with a viable framework for improv-
ing the service quality of their offerings.71
SES companies that are able to perform well on these dimensions are more 
likely to be successful in the marketplace. In addition, tangibles are particularly 
important for certain SES companies when physical assets are involved, such as 
rooms, apartments, or vehicles. Hence, proper maintenance and care of such 
physical assets is important for those SES companies. As discussed earlier, the 
research in service triads indicates that SES companies run the risk of being disin-
termediated. Given this finding, we believe that it is all the more important for an 
SES company to consistently deliver high-quality service and ensure long-term 
customer loyalty.
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Another challenge for these thin stack companies is ensuring the quality and 
consistency of the experience received by the customers. Each of the suppliers typi-
cally operates independently of the other suppliers in the network, and often, these 
suppliers are relative novices, such as residential owners offering their homes/
apartments for rent for short periods of time. Consequently, these suppliers may not 
have had the proper training necessary to create great customer experiences. Some 
firms, such as HomeAway and Airbnb, provide reviews by previous customers, but 
many suppliers do not have any reviews, and those that do typically have only a 
small number of reviews available, which are not necessarily highly reliable. 
Therefore, SES companies should ideally provide a certain degree of training to sup-
pliers and make customer reviews available to their suppliers to ensure that a high 
and consistent level of service quality is provided to all customers.
Offering great customer experiences goes hand-in-hand with fostering trust. 
But building trust with customers can be somewhat difficult for an SES company 
because it primarily interacts with its customers via an online digital platform, and 
not via face-to-face contact. However, an online platform also offers the capability to 
show customers photos or videos of the service delivery in action, which can be used 
to foster trust. For example, Rover offers the ability to share photos of dog sitters 
interacting with dogs. In addition, it offers 24/7 veterinarian consultations to ease 
dog owners’ worries about their pets, thereby fostering trust among its customers.
Recommendations for Traditional Service Firms That Compete with SES 
Companies
For traditional firms to successfully compete with the SES companies, 
Cusumano offers a few suggestions,72 including the following: work with local 
governments to level the playing field with respect to rules and regulations by 
ensuring that these are not being violated by SES companies; provide a signifi-
cantly higher level of service and greater standardization across locations that, at 
least in the short run, the SES firms will not be able to match because their sup-
pliers are typically inexperienced independent operators; and continue to seg-
ment the market, focusing on those segments where SES firms cannot compete, 
like large groups and conferences in the hotel industry.
Traditional service companies also need to recognize that SES companies 
are not a passing fad; rather, in many cases, they represent the future direction of 
business in terms of emerging business models and new market segments, often 
cannibalizing the business of existing traditional firms. The traditional businesses 
do, however, have some options, as noted above, for competing with these SES 
firms, but they must be willing to adapt, be flexible, and adjust their businesses 
accordingly.
Summary and Conclusion
The significant growth of SESs can be attributed mainly to the reduced 
transaction costs in the matching of customers and service suppliers made 
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possible by SES companies. The ability of SES companies to facilitate the shar-
ing of underutilized assets with others to recover part of the cost of owning the 
assets is another important driver of the emerging sharing economy.
The idea of “sharing” has been the primary attraction and the driver behind 
the rise of the sharing economy. After all, what is there not to like about using the 
power of the internet to help a friend—give a car ride, or help save a neighbor 
some time by running an errand—and also make some money in the process? 
Although SES companies are essentially based on that vision, as discussed earlier, 
there is often a disconnect between the vision and the reality—as demonstrated 
by the questionable business practices of at least a few SES companies. These 
aberrations will most likely get corrected through market forces or regulatory 
actions as the industry matures.
Using secondary data, we analyzed the business operations of a large num-
ber of SES companies in several industries, and subsequently developed the pro-
posed business model consisting of nine building blocks—Competitive Priorities, 
Value Propositions, Customers, Suppliers, Partners, Delivery Channels, Key 
Activities, Revenue Stream, and Cost Structure—that can be used to generate and 
describe a business model for SES companies. Based on the analysis of 53 case 
studies and of the successes and failures in business practices of those SES compa-
nies, we made four specific recommendations to the entrepreneurs and managers 
of SES companies and three specific recommendations to the managers of tradi-
tional firms in industries in which the SES companies compete.
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